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THE LEGAL/EXTRA-LEGAL
CONTROVERSY: JUDICIAL DECISIONS
IN PRETRIAL RELEASE
ILENE H. NAGEL*
This study analyzes data for state criminal defendants prosecuted
in New York to determine the bases upon which judges make pretrial
release decisions for these defendants. Treating statutory law as
defining the category of legal variables, it finds legal factors
substantially affect decisions about whether to release a defendant on
recognizance, the amount of bail required, and whether to offer a
defendant a cash alternative to a surety bond. The impact of these
factors varies, however, depending upon the particular decision being
made. Factors not prescribed in the statute-extra-legal factors--are
also found to affect these pretrial release decisions. Their impact, too,
is decision context specific. Among the extra-legal factors that affect
pretrial release decisions, the effects of status characteristics of the
defendant pale in comparison to the effects of bench bias and
measures of the defendant's dangerousness.
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly six decades both social scientists and lawyers
have been preoccupied with the search for evidence that law in
theory differs dramatically from the law in action. For social
scientists in general and criminologists especially this search
has commonly focused on amassing data to test the hypothesis
that extra-legal considerations, such as race, class, and
ethnicity, account for substantial variation in the application of
laws and sanctions. Some researchers have interpreted their
data to mean that the legal prescriptions that supposedly guide
decision-making are of distinctly secondary importance.
* Support for this research was provided by a Yale Law School Daniel
and Florence Guggenheim Fellowship to the author, by the Indiana University
School of Law, and by the Rockefeller Foundation Scholar-in-Residence
program in Bellagio, Italy. Special thanks are extended to Richard Berk,
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and David Thomas for their comments on earlier drafts. Thanks are extended
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In 1974, Hagan turned his attention to the claimed priority
of extra-legal factors in criminal sentencing. Reanalyzing data
drawn from twenty sentencing studies, Hagan concluded:
... while there may be evidence of differential
sentencing, knowledge of extra-legal offender
characteristics contributes relatively little to our ability
to predict judicial dispositions (1974: 379).
McBarnet (1981), reviewing claims for the priority of extra-
legal factors, was prompted to write:
... Explicitly or implicitly the question underlying
sociological analysis of the criminal justice process
always seems to be concerned with why the people
who routinely operate the law also routinely depart
from the principles of justice... violating the principle
of equality before the law by being more likely to
arrest, convict, or sentence with greater severity lower-
rather than middle- or upper-class people, blacks,
rather than whites .... One study after another shows
up class, race, and sex prejudices . .. [But] what is
barely touched on is the nature and role of the law
itself... (1981: 3-4).
"Law in action" research has almost entirely lost sight of the
most obvious dimension to consider-the law itself:
... Ironically ... some vague notion of "the law" is
usually there as a background assumption, as a vague
standard from which the law enforcers under study are
assumed to deviate .... [However, while] the "law in
action" is scrutinized ... what the "law in the books"
actually says is simply assumed ... (McBarnet, 1981:
5).
The criticism is a fair one. The claimed priority of extra-
legal factors has clearly, and properly, become controversial. In
visiting the legal/extra-legal controversy, I wish to emphasize
an important point of departure from prior attempts to examine
the issue. "Extra-legal" in this study is not considered
synonymous with "illegal," "inappropriate," or "socially
unjust." It is defined as that which is "extra" to the law, i.e.,
not specifically prescribed in the relevant statutory law. I do
not mean by this definition to imply that unless a factor is
specifically prescribed by statute it can never be part of the
law. I do, however, claim that this is a useful starting point for
those who seek to ground the legal/extra-legal debate in a
context that is sensitive to the actual prescriptions of written
law. By beginning in this way, I may be better able to untangle
the morass of that heretofore unspecified residual category
which has passed for extra-legal; and I may be better able to
gain insight into the effects of indisputably legal variables.
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This research focuses on pretrial release decisions in
criminal cases. New York, the jurisdiction studied, has a
statute that specifies the factors a court may appropriately
consider in deciding whether to grant bail and the amount at
which granted bail should be set. I examine the legal/extra-
legal controversy in this context by comparing the influence of
those factors prescribed in the Bail Statute with the influence
of those not prescribed. The comparisons are broken down by
stages of the pretrial release decision so that I can explore the
relative influence of legal and extra-legal variables on different
kinds of decisions.
I expect that more than law in theory dictates law in action.
I hope that this examination of different aspects of bail setting
will reveal differences in the relative influence of different legal
and extra-legal factors, for the interesting task is not to spot a
gap between the law on the books and the law in action but to
understand why legal rules may on some occasions have
considerable influence and on other occasions be relatively
inconsequential.
Social scientists, often assuming a gap between law in
theory and law in action, have concentrated their efforts on
searching for discriminatory practices on the part of those who
administer the law. (See, for example, Lemert, 1951; Becker,
1963; Kitsuse and Cicourel, 1963; Quinney, 1970; Burke and
Turk, 1975; Chiricos and Waldo, 1975; Hagan, 1975; Swigert and
Farrell, 1977; Bernstein et al., 1977a; Bernstein et al., 1977b;
Lizotte, 1978; LaFree, 1980; Unnever et al., 1980; Nagel and
Hagan, 1982a; Wheeler et al., 1982; Hagan and Nagel, 1982.) The
implicit message is that if discrimination could be eliminated,
the gap would disappear. Legal realists have recognized that
the gap is structural. General rules of law cannot dictate
specific outcomes; discretion must always intervene. Yet the
question remains: Does discretion operate in discriminatory
ways? If so, is it because decision-makers violate the principles
of equality before the law, or is it because applicable rules of
law have discriminatory implications?
To address these issues, one must look at the relative
contributions of formal written law and extra-legal factors to
outcomes and the ways in which their relative influence is
context dependent. One must also look at the outcomes
themselves. If class-based discrimination is apparent, the task
is to determine whether observed patterns are attributable to
formal written law, extra-legal factors, or both.
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The study of pretrial release decisions is for several
reasons particularly well suited to an exploration of the issues
just identified. First, and most important, the pretrial release
decision is the only major criminal court processing decision
for which there is a formal set of statutorily prescribed
guidelines specifying particular factors to be considered in the
making of the decision. In New York the Bail Statute states
the following:
To the extent that the issuance of an order of
recognizance or bail and the terms thereof are matters
of discretion . . . an application is determined on the
basis of the following factors and criteria...
a) With respect to any principal, the court must
consider the kind and degree of control or
restriction that is necessary to secure his court
attendance when required. In determining that
matter, the court must, on the basis of available
information, consider and take into account:
(i) The principal's character, reputation, habits
and mental condition; and
(ii) His employment and financial resources;
and
(iii) His family ties and the length of his
residence if any in the community; and
(iv) His criminal record if any; and
(v) His previous record if any in responding to
his court appearances when required or
with respect to flight to avoid criminal
prosecution; and
(vi) If he is a defendant, the weight of the
evidence against him in the pending
criminal action and any other factor
indicating probability or improbability of
conviction; or, in the case of an application
for bail or recognizance pending appeal, the
merit or lack of merit to the appeal; and
(vii) If he is a defendant, the sentence which may
be or has been imposed upon conviction
(N.Y.S. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
510.30 § 2).
Because the statute specifically lists the factors to be
considered in determining conditions of release, one can come
closer in this setting than in most others to ascertaining
whether the statutory law has an effect on the outcome
decisions. Furthermore, one can compare the effect of factors
prescribed in the statute, i.e., legal factors, to those not
prescribed, i.e., extra-legal factors, and can identify the
conditions under which the effects of these legal and extra-
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legal factors vary.'
Second, the pretrial release decision is generally a three-
tiered process, each decision being a refinement of the
preceding one. The first decision is whether to release the
defendant on recognizance, i.e., on an unsecured promise by
the defendant to be in court for scheduled appearances. 2 If the
decision is made not to release the defendant on recognizance,
then, absent a judgment that the defendant is unbailable, 3 the
next decision concerns the dollar amount of the required
surety bond.4 Finally, some defendants are given the option of
posting a cash alternative to the surety bond, ordinarily in the
amount of 10 percent of the surety figure. The cash alternative
option increases the likelihood that a defendant will meet the
terms for release.
I As noted earlier, to classify only those factors prescribed for
consideration in the statute as the "legal factors" is to narrowly conceptualize
the word "legal." Judicial consideration of factors not specifically prescribed
may be legal as well, for the statute does not say that the court must not
consider any factor not here mentioned. However, as a first step in addressing
the legal/extra-legal controversy, it is essential to determine whether those
factors which the statute says a court must consider have an impact. Once
non-statutory factors that have an impact are identified, one can engage in
further research and analysis to determine whether these factors cannot legally
guide judicial discretion.
2 According to my interviews and observations, the first question judges
address is the question of whether a defendant should be released on
recognizance or whether some restrictive terms will be necessary to condition
the release of the defendant. Moreover, it often appeared as if, subsequent to
the decision not to release a defendant on recognizance, the judge wrestled not
only with the question of an amount of bail to require but also with the issue of
whether bail should be set higher than the defendant could meet so as to
detain the defendant preventively.
3 In accordance with People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison et al.
and People v. Melville, a reading of New York case law suggests that it is
appropriate to deny bail under certain circumstances. These cases are
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Carlson v. Landon that there is
no constitutional right to bail, and a court is not obligated to release a
defendant on bail. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
does, however, specify that when bail is set, it cannot be set in an unreasonably
high amount and must not be set as a punitive measure. In People ex rel. Shaw
v. Lombard the court held "There are three situations which affect the pretrial
release of a defendant: (1) the necessity to insure the defendant's response to
the processes of the court, (2) the necessity to protect potential witnesses from
the defendant and (3) the necessity to protect the community from a
dangerous defendant." There is no debate on the fact that the purpose of
requiring the defendant to post bail after his arrest is to insure his appearance
in court. The court, however, does hold that "although there is no statutory
authority in New York to detain in order to protect potential witnesses from a
defendant, case law has recognized the denial of bail in situations where the
defendant would present a danger to potential witnesses if permitted to remain
at liberty" (see, for example, People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger). The court
concludes that under certain circumstances, a defendant can be denied bail.
4 A request for a surety bond requires the defendant to have a bail
bondsman post bail with the court for the defendant. Regardless of
appearance, the bondsman receives a fee, usually 10% of the amount of the bail
bond.
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The advantage of studying a three-tiered decision is that it
allows one to attend to the possibility that as a legal judgment
is successively refined, different factors may affect decisions.
In other words, decision stages are a source of contextual
variation. Nothing in the statute suggests that the specified
criteria (legal factors) are not meant by the legislature to apply
in the same way to the three sequentially occurring pretrial
decisions, but the complexity of the issues and the
consequences that might ensue from different outcomes at
different stages may vary substantially.
Third, the pretrial release decision has been found to affect
subsequent criminal justice processing decisions (e.g., Ares et
al., 1963; Landes, 1974; Bernstein et al., 1977a; Hagan et al.,
1980). Thus, the study of bail decisions is interesting both in its
own right and as an aid to understanding how defendants come
to be differentially situated at later stages of their cases.
Fourth, the bail statute is interesting in that the enacted
legislation is in some respects inconsistent with public
sentiment. The New York Bail Statute does not authorize a
judge to deny bail or to set high bail in order to prevent
defendants from engaging in future criminal activity. The
possibility of preventive pretrial detention was considered by
the state legislature and rejected. Legal scholars are divided on
the issue, but the public is generally presumed to support the
concept, albeit perhaps only for cases involving violent crime.5
(Federal Bail Procedures, 1964; 1981; Thomas, 1976; Carbone,
1977; American Bar Association, 1978; Kennedy, 1979). A study
of the application of the Bail Statute provides one opportunity
to examine whether "the formal law," as measured by
statutorily prescribed considerations, is adhered to when the
risk of public criticism is substantial. To the extent that public
pressure attenuates conformity with the written law, a lack of
conformity might be explained as stemming partially from a
law that fails to reflect the moral sentiments of the community.
Finally, every part of the legal system has its own special
procedures and its own way of making rules and decisions.
Each part responds to the cluster of forces that impinge on it in
5 A review of case law suggests that judges too may have mixed views of
preventive detention. In People ex reL Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison et al.
the court held that New York's constitution, by prohibiting excessive bail, did
not accord to all defendants an undeniable right to bail, but rather forbade only
excessive bail. Thus, in certain circumstances, the denial of bail in non-capital
felony cases was held to be proper. In People v. Melville, in a major departure
from previous cases, Judge Lang held that pretrial detention "for the safety of
the community through the denial of bail... is constitutionally justifiable in
extraordinary cases."
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a different way (Friedman, 1977). This means that the
application of legal rules will be affected by the task that the
legal decision-maker confronts. Thus, while the study of
pretrial release decisions complements studies of arrest (e.g.,
Black, 1971), prosecution (e.g., Miller, 1970), plea bargains (e.g.,
Sudnow, 1965; Bernstein et al., 1977b), and sentencing (e.g.,
Wolfgang and Riedel, 1973; Chiricos and Waldo, 1975), it is
distinctive insofar as it is a decision that occurs in a separate
context and is subject to separate concerns, pressures, and
considerations.
11. RESEARCH ISSUES
My analysis focuses on four issues. The data do not
resolve any of the issues raised here, but they do provide a
starting point for rethinking and reconceptualizing the
legal/extra-legal controversy.
First, I ask whether the formal law, as embodied in those
factors that are statutorily prescribed, affects pretrial release
outcomes. To address this question, indicators of some of the
seven items (i-vii) that the Bail Statute instructs judges to
consider are examined. It is not necessarily illegal to consider
factors that are not statutorily prescribed, but if mandated
factors are not considered, there is a failure of legality even if
the final decision does not reflect impermissible considerations.
Second, to allow for the possibility of contextual variation, I
examine the degree to which the impact of these statutorily
prescribed factors is consistent across the three stages of
decision-making for pretrial release.
Third, to the extent that the legally prescribed factors do
not account for all of the variation in pretrial release outcomes,
I attempt to determine whether factors not mentioned in the
statute (extra-legal factors) affect the outcomes.
Finally, I ask whether the emphasis in the literature on
class, race, and sex as the predominant extra-legal influences is
borne out by these data, or whether some of the effects
attributable to factors not prescribed by law are extra-legal
without being clearly illegal or unjust. To the extent that we
can identify which extra-legal variables have an impact, we can
better understand the bases upon which pretrial decisions are
made and the relationship between formal law and other
factors that affect these decisions.
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III. THE SAMPLE
The sample used in this study consists of all those cases
(N=5594) first arraigned in criminal court in one borough of the
city of New York between December, 1974, and March, 1975.6
This group includes both accused felons and accused
misdemeanants. Defendants whose cases were finally disposed
of at their first court presentation were excluded because no
pretrial release decisions were made for them. Cases not
admitted to bail because the defendants were remanded to
custody are also excluded. Where the presumption of guilt is
great, and the potential danger to society extraordinary,
defendants may as a matter of New York law be denied the
right to bail.7
IV. DATA
For each of the 5594 defendants, information was recorded
concerning prior criminal records (no prior arrests, arrests but
no convictions, convictions for misdemeanors or violations, or
convictions for felonies 8 ), the severity of the most serious
crime charged (following the nine-point classification of New
York's Penal Code), race/ethnicity (i.e., black, white,
Hispanic9 ), highest school grade completed, age, sex, primary
speaking language (i.e., Spanish, English10 ), and the Pretrial
6 Arraignment court, the setting for this research, is a lower criminal
court. All criminal defendants, regardless of the severity of their charge, were
arraigned in this court.
7 It is important to note that while the court has held that the denial of
bail is appropriate in cases where the potential danger to society is
extraordinary, or there is a demonstrable need to protect witnesses, the court
has never held that it is appropriate to set high bail to diminish the probability
of release or to accomplish the purpose of preventive detention. (See People ex
rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison et al. and People v. Melville.)
8 I distinguish between convictions for felony offenses on the one hand
and convictions for lesser offenses or arrests but no convictions on the other for
two reasons: (1) prior research (e.g., Bernstein et al., 1977b) finds responses
differ according to the nature of the prior record, and (2) my observations led
me to believe that judges and prosecutors treat records of felony convictions
more seriously than they do records of misdemeanor convictions. I did not
further refine the categories into level of felony conviction (e.g., A felony versus
D felony) because the court records were not so refined as to permit this kind
of classification.
9 Hispanic refers to persons with Spanish surnames, e.g., Gonzalez,
Huerrera. I divide race/ethnicity into three categories in order to be able to
determine whether the Hispanic population (largely of Puerto Rican origin) is
treated differently from the blacks or whites.
10 A separate category is made for persons whose primary language is
Spanish because my observations suggested that those who are dependent
upon translators created special problems for the courts. One possible
response would be to discriminate against those who did not speak English. It
should be noted that the correlation between those whose surname is Hispanic
and those whose primary language is Spanish is low enough that this
additional coded variable did not create problems of multicollinearity.
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Services Agency's recommendation regarding release on
recognizance (ROR)." The criminal record data came from
state files; other information came from reports prepared by a
Pretrial Services Agency which interviewed defendants within
24 hours of their arrest and, in the case of severity, from court
files. Measures of prior record, charge severity, and ROR
recommendation are included because they may be considered
"legal" variables. Variables that capture the race/ethnicity,
age, sex, education, and primary language of the defendant are
important because the thesis that such extra-legal
characteristics improperly influence court action is at the heart
of the legal/extra-legal debate. Quinney (1970: 140) states this
thesis as follows:
. . . judicial decisions are not made uniformly.
Decisions are made according to a host of extra-legal
factors, including the age of the offender, his race and
social class...
Reiss (1974), drawing on the work of Schrag (1971),
summarizes this position:
. . . A growing body of evidence . . . on the
distributive property of criminal justice . . .
demonstrates that there is much de facto
discrimination. The poor and the minorities . . . are
likely to be sanctioned more severely, and to be denied
their rights and the full opportunity to defend their
interests (Reiss, 1974: 694).
Information was also coded on three variables that might
reflect the degree to which a defendant is likely to be perceived
as potentially dangerous. These indicate whether: (1) the
defendant was being prosecuted for possession of a dangerous
weapon; (2) the most serious charge for which the defendant
11 During the time at which these data were collected, there was a Pretrial
Services Agency whose primary purpose was to collect information on
defendants, especially on their community ties, so as to be able to make
recommendations for release to the judge, during arraignment proceedings.
Pretrial Services agents interviewed defendants immediately following their
arrest. Every attempt was made to verify the information received from the
defendant prior to making a decision to recommend, or not recommend, release
at arraignment. The recommendation of the Pretrial Services agents was in
accordance with the only legitimate purpose of bail, which is to ensure a
defendant's appearance in court. The Pretrial Agency made one of three
recommendations for each defendant: (1) recommended for release on
recognizance-demographic data verified; (2) recommended for release on
recognizance-demographic data not verified; (3) no recommendation. After
interviewing Pretrial agents, I opted to collapse the first two categories into one
category-recommended for release on recognizance. This category, for
purposes of these analyses, was compared to those for whom no
recommendation for release on recognizance was made. For a discussion of the
relationship between this recommendation and the defendant's community
ties, see the text accompanying note 23 infra.
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was being prosecuted is classified as a violent crime;12 and
(3) one of the charged offenses was resisting arrest. 13
Attention to dangerousness is not prescribed by the New York
Bail Statute, but some case law allows the denial of bail when
there appears to be an extraordinary potential for danger (see
People v. Melville). However, the instances in which courts
might properly attend to dangerousness in deciding whether to
set bail are exceedingly rare, and the New York courts have
never held that danger may affect the amount at which bail is
set or the mode of release (People ex rel. Schweizer v. Welch;
People v. Torres).
Information was also collected on the pendency of other
charges at the time of this arraignment. In most instances, the
presence of an "open case" indicates that the crime for which
pretrial release data were collected was committed while the
accused was free pending trial for some other offense. It seems
likely that those with open charges will fare poorly at this
arraignment since they will be thought to have abused a prior
opportunity for freedom. Depending upon one's interpretation
of the statutory language, 14 this may be an example of an extra-
legal variable that can affect the pretrial outcome decisions
without implying invidious discrimination.
Finally, I have information on a variable not heretofore
examined in empirical research on pretrial release decisions:
the identity of the judge presiding at the arraignment hearing.
Since my interest is not in particular judges but rather in the
variation of decisions across judges, the data on judges are
reported using a code that does not permit individual
identification.
Information on each of the above variables is presented to
the judge at the arraignment proceeding. These are not,
however, the only variables about which judges are sometimes
12 A review of the penal law categories for the state of New York led me to
classify offenses into "violent" and "less violent" crimes. Those classified as
violent include: first, second, and third degree assault; homicide, murder,
manslaughter; first, second, and third degree rape; first, second, and third
degree sexual abuse; first, second, third, and fourth degree arson; and first,
second, and third degree robbery. With the exception of arson, these are all
crimes traditionally categorized as involving personal violence. I included
arson as well because I believe that it is more like the crimes of personal
violence than it is like the traditional property offenses.
13 This charge may also indicate a special interest by the police in high or
no bail, either to punish the defendant or to dissuade the filing of a civil suit.
Whatever interpretation one puts on it, it is extra-legal.
14 Unless one believes that the existence of an open case is evidence of a
defendant's character or reputation, specified as legal in item i of the statute,
the fact that a defendant has an open case should be considered an extra-legal
variable.
NAGEL 491
informed. On an unsystematic basis, often as a result of
speculation by the defense attorney, judges may be informed of
such things as the defendant's weekly salary, family situation
(e.g., number of dependents), and welfare status. While such
information might properly influence pretrial release decisions,
the inconsistency with which information of this type was
preserved in official records prevented me from including
variables capturing such information in the analyses. I do not
believe that this constitutes a substantial gap because courts
did not routinely have information of this sort and when they
did it was often presented in a haphazard and unverifiable
fashion.'5
I have no data that measure the weight of the evidence, a
potentially important legal variable. However, my six months
of observations of arraignment procedures indicate that judges
similarly do not have, or fail to consider, information pertaining
to the weight of the evidence. This is largely because of the
brief period of time given to arraignment proceedings. Pretrial
Services agents also have no information on evidence. This
means, however, that my findings will not necessarily
generalize to jurisdictions that make evidentiary or other
information I lack routinely available at the arraignment stage.
In addition to the archival record data noted above,
qualitative data were collected through my observations of
arraignment procedures over a period of six months. During
the observations, I reviewed the "court papers"'16 immediately
following their presentation to the presiding judge. This
process was possible because I was seated alongside the judge,
on the bench, before and during arraignment procedures.
While no formal analysis of these observational data was done,
my observations, as well as information gleaned in
conversations with the judges about the "whys" of their
decisions, helped guide the design of the analysis and
influenced my interpretations of the findings.
15 In an analysis of the determinants of pretrial outcomes for defendants
prosecuted in federal rather than state courts, I find a defendant's earnings
have no effect on the type of pretrial release condition. Married defendants
and those on welfare, however, are more likely to be asked to meet less
restrictive conditions in order to be released (see Stryker et al., 1983).
16 Court papers are those materials presented to the judicial officer, for
example, the police report, the report of prior arrests and convictions, the
report of the charge against the defendant filed by the prosecutor, and the
recommendation of the Pretrial Services Agency.
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V. ANALYSIS
The data are analyzed by means of dummy variable
regression procedures. Table 1 lists all independent and
dependent variables and tells how each was coded.17 The
correlation matrix of the independent variables was reviewed
to check for serious problems of multicollinearity before any
analyses were done. No problems of multicollinearity were
noted.18
Table 1. Variables: Scaling, Notation, and Frequencies
Notation Variable Scale Frequency
Y1  Decision at First Not Released on 43.6
Arraignment Recognizance (0)
Released on 56.4
Recognizance (1)
Y2  For Defendants not Logarithm of Bail X=2.93
ROR'd, Amount of Amount (Interval) s.d.=.59
Bail Set
Actual Bail (in $) X=$2096.38
s.d.=6189.95
Y3  For Defendants for No Cash Alternative (0) 53.3
Whom Bail was Set,
the Cash Alternative Cash Alternative (1) 46.7
Option
X, Pretrial Services Agency Not Recommended for 35.9
Recommendation for ROR (-1)
ROR
Recommended for ROR 64.1
(1)
X2  Defendant's Age (Interval) X=27.10
s.d.=9.4
X 3  Defendant's Sex Female (-1) 10.5
Male (1) 89.5
X4 Defendant's Hispanic (-1) 43.3
Race/Ethnicity I Black (0) 44.4
White (1) 12.3
X5  Defendant's Hispanic (-1) 43.3
Race/Ethnicity 1 White (0) 12.3
Black (1) 44.4
Xe Defendant's Primary English (-1) 87.8
Language Spanish (1) 12.2
X7  Highest Grade in School (Interval) X=10.05Defendant Completed s.d.=l.89
17 Nominal variables are effect coded in accordance with the arguments of
Kerlinger and Pedhazur (1973) that effect coding, comparing each category to
the mean of the other categories rather than to an excluded category, is
preferable in exploratory research.
18 With the exception of the correlation between violent offense and
charge severity, the only correlations that are over .4 are those between
categories of the same variable. These correlations do not reflect
multicollinearity; rather they are an inescapable byproduct of effect coding.
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Notation Variable Scale Frequency
X8  Severity (According to Violation (1) 11.5
New York Penal Unclassified 0.0
Code) of First Misdemeanor (2)
Presentation Charge B Misdemeanor (3) 3.6
(Charge Prosecuted) A Misdemeanor (4) 21.0
E Felony (5) 12.2
D Felony (6) 27.5
C Felony (7) 10.9
B Felony (8) 10.9
A Felony (9) 2.4
X 9  Prior Criminal Record I No Prior Arrests (-1) 26.0
Arrests with No 66.3
Convictions, Arrests
with Misdemeanor
Convictions (0)
Arrests with Felony 7.7
Convictions (1)
X1 0 Prior Criminal Record H No Prior Arrests (-1) 26.0
Arrests with 22.1
Misdemeanor or
Felony Convictions
(0)
Arrests with No 51.9
Convictions (1)
X 11  Prior Criminal Record No Prior Arrests (-1) 26.0
II Arrests but No 59.7
Convictions or Felony
Convictions (0)
Arrests with 14.4
Misdemeanor
Convictions (1)
X 12  Defendant's Charges No (-1) 97.7
Include Possession of
a Dangerous Weapon Yes (1) 2.3
X 13  Most Serious Charge for Non-Violent (-1) 72.1
Which Defendant Was
Prosecuted is a Violent (1) 27.9
"Violent" Crime (See
note 12, supra)
X 14  Defendant's Charges No (-1) 98.1
Include Resisting
Arrest Yes (1) 1.9
X 15  In Addition to this Case, No Open Cases (-1) 76.4
the Defendant has
Other Pending Cases. Open Cases (1) 23.6
X 16-X25 Represent the ten judges who presided over pretrial decisions.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the results of the regression
equations for the three dependent variables respectively, i.e.,
Y 1 whether the defendant was released on recognizance or bail
was set; Y 2 the log of the amount at which bail was set if bail
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was set;19 and Y3 whether the judicial officer offered a cash
alternative at a sum below the dollar figure of the bail bond.2 0
For the first dependent variable, Y, (whether the
defendant was released on recognizance or bail was set), I
computed the regression equation for the total sample of 5594
defendants. Y, is regressed on all of the independent variables
listed in Table 1. Table 2 presents the regression coefficients
for only those independent variables whose effects were
statistically significant at .10 or better.2 1
For the second dependent variable, Y2 (the log of the
amount at which bail was set), the same procedure as outlined
above is followed, except that only data on those defendants
who were not released on recognizance (i.e., had bail set) are
included (N=2083).
For the third dependent variable, Y3 (the offering of a cash
alternative), the analysis is based only on data for defendants
for whom bail was set (N=2083). As with Y, and Y2, the cash
alternative option is regressed on the set of independent
variables listed in Table 1.
VI. RESULTS
A. Do Statutorily Prescribed Factors Affect Judicial Decisions
About Pretrial Release?
Despite efforts by the drafters of the Bail Statute to clearly
specify legally prescribed considerations, the statutory
language allows some dispute over whether any particular
variable does or does not fall under one of the seven statutorily
specified criteria. For example, almost anything could be
construed as a measure of a defendant's character or
reputation. My many months of observation and interviews,
however, lead me to believe that the participants in the process
did not always assume that any information they gave was
related to some specified criterion. Instead, some information
19 In examining the distribution of bail amounts, I noted that the
distribution of amounts of bail was skewed. To lessen the impact of outliers, I
took the natural logarithm of the amount of bail as the dependent variable. The
substantive implications of the findings do not change from what they would be
had I used dollar amounts, but I cannot make statements about particular
changes in the independent variables producing changes of X dollars in the
bail amount.
20 Cash alternative was coded as being present if the cash figure
requested was lower than the bond (e.g., $2000 bond or $200 cash). If it was not
lower (e.g., $1000 bond or $1000 cash), I coded the defendant as having no cash
alternative.
21 Goldberger (1964) recommends this more liberal significance level in
the case of dummy dichotomous dependent variables. It is particularly
appropriate in exploratory research.
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would be acknowledged by almost everyone to be statutorily
irrelevant, and other information was thought to relate largely
or entirely to a single criterion. Without wishing to deny the
inevitable subjectivity and arbitrariness of any classification, I
believe the following are consistent with the statutorily
(legally) prescribed considerations.
Item i mandates the consideration of the defendant's
character, reputation, habits, and mental condition. Apart from
a judge's possible subjective judgment of the defendant's
mental condition, my observations of arraignment procedures
revealed that no information on these considerations was
systematically presented to the court, nor was systematic
inquiry made in the absence of blatant aberrational behavior.
22
Since my quantitative analysis is based on recorded data, no
measure of these legal dimensions was included.
Item ii says the defendant's employment and financial
resources should be taken into account. Specific information
on these matters was not routinely presented to the court, but
the court knew that the Pretrial Services Agency's
recommendation for release on recognizance was based in part
on the defendant's employment situation. Reliable data on
financial resources were often neither presented nor the
subject of judicial inquiry.
Item iii mandates the consideration of family ties and
length of residence in the community. Again specific
information regarding these matters was seldom presented in
court, but the judges knew that family ties and community
residence were among the seven factors that determined the
Pretrial Services Agency's recommendation. 23 Because those
with substantial community ties (employment, long time
22 In six months of observation, for example, only once did I observe a
discussion of a defendant's mental condition. In this particular instance, the
defendant identified himself as "God's angel." His behavior in the courtroom
was so substantially at odds with expectations for defendant behavior that the
judge was prompted to request a psychiatric investigation. The pretrial hearing
was rescheduled to follow the presentation of the psychiatric report.
23 The Pretrial Services Agency based its recommendation for release on
responses to seven items: (1) length of residence; (2) phone in a residence;
(3) someone is expected to accompany the defendant at arraignment (not
including the complainant or the attorney); (4) family ties; (5) employment
history; (6) prior felony convictions; (7) verified responses to one or more
questions. Each of the items was equally weighted. Defendants with scores of
four or above were recommended for release. For example, if a defendant had
a phone (+1), lived at his current address for 2 years (+1), lived with a
parent or spouse (+1), and was employed (+1), he would be recommended for
release. Any combination of positive scores totaling four resulted in a positive
recommendation for release on recognizance. Importantly, a negative on any
particular item, e.g., prior felony conviction, did not preclude a
recommendation for release.
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residence, and close family relationships) were more likely to
be recommended for ROR, while those with no community ties
found it very difficult to secure an ROR recommendation, I
treat the recommendation of the Pretrial Services Agency as an
indication of the defendant's status with respect to those
factors whose consideration is mandated by items ii and iii. It
is true that a defendant who was employed or had some but
not all possible community ties might not receive a favorable
recommendation, but, generally speaking, the judge had no way
of knowing this. Also a defendant tied to the community in
only one way but with all other factors favorable might be
recommended for ROR. Importantly, the variable-
recommended for release-is not so much a proxy for the
defendant's actual community ties as it is for the judge's
perception of such ties.
Item iv addresses the question of the defendant's prior
criminal record. Data on prior arrests, as well as misdemeanor
and felony convictions, were included.
Item v mandates consideration of prior records or failures
to appear or flight to avoid prosecution. Information was not
routinely presented on this issue despite its seeming relevance
to the likelihood of subsequent court appearances. 24
Item vi mandates consideration of the strength of the
evidence. The assumption is that the greater the likelihood of a
conviction with its accompanying penalty, the greater the
incentive to flee. The records available to me contained no
information on the strength of the evidence, but the judges
were similarly in the dark. They usually made pretrial release
decisions before probable cause hearings were held, and
evidentiary matters were rarely alluded to in the bail
hearings. 5
Item vii prescribes consideration of the sentence that may
be imposed upon conviction. Since the New York Penal Code
24 In a study of pretrial outcomes for federal defendants, where data for
prior record of flight are systematically available, I find that contrary to my
expectations, a prior failure to appear does not substantially affect the
restrictiveness of the conditions of pretrial release (see Stryker et al., 1983).
This finding is interpreted as support for the thesis that judges are not
determining pretrial release outcomes solely on the basis of whether the
defendant is likely to appear.
25 My analyses are based on the initial pretrial release decision made
following arrest. Some defendants had subsequent pretrial hearings following
their probable cause hearing. In these cases, it may be that more evidentiary
material was considered. I note too that when questions of the strength of the
evidence were raised at the initial pretrial release hearing, the issue was often
raised in the following manner-. The judge would ask the Assistant District
Attorney to comment, without supporting materials, on the strength of the
case.
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links the severity of the offense (e.g., A, B felony) to the
maximum sentence, I treat charge severity as a measure of this
consideration. 2
6
To summarize, my interpretation of the statutory
prescriptions suggests that the following variables may be
classified as legal: the statutory severity of offenses for which
defendants are charged, their prior criminal records, and the
recommendations of the Pretrial Services Agency. I am unable
to measure other variables, such as evidentiary strength and
financial resources, but am comforted by the fact that judges
too appeared to know little of such matters. The other
variables included in Table 1, such as sex, age, ethnicity, and
the identity of the judge, are for reasons mentioned earlier
classified as extra-legal.
Turning to Table 2 and the decision whether to release a
defendant on recognizance (Y,), we find that those variables
which reflect factors mentioned in the Bail Statute significantly
affect this decision. A recommendation for release by the
Pretrial Services Agency is positively associated with the
decision to release on recognizance, while charge severity and
prior convictions for both misdemeanors and felonies have the
expected negative association. While legal factors are not the
only ones significantly associated with the release decision, one
can safely conclude that they are important to this first pretrial
release decision. Regressing Y, on the legal variables alone
tells us that by themselves, but not discounting variance
shared with extra-legal variables, they explain 19 percent of the
variance.27 The total explained variance for Y, by legal and
extra-legal variables is .21.
An examination of Table 3, in which the amount of set bail
(Y 2 ) is the dependent variable, reveals a somewhat different
26 One can argue that sentence severity relates to both the lawful purpose
of predicting appearance and the unlawful purpose of predicting new crime.
Thus, sentence severity is a measure of potential danger as well as risk of
appearance. There is no way to separate the two ways in which sentence
severity may relate to decisions for pretrial release.
27 This figure refers to the gross effect of the legal variables. In a recent
article (see Stryker et al., 1983), using data on pretrial release decisions for
federal defendants, I present gross and net effects for sets of variables
including those that tap ascribed status characteristics of the defendant,
achieved status characteristics of the defendant, characteristics of the offense
charged, characteristics associated with the act of being processed in the
criminal justice system, and characteristics of the organizational context in
which the defendant is prosecuted. In a separate article (Nagel et al., 1983) on
judicial compliance with the Federal Bail Reform Act, I compute gross and net
effects for a more complete list of legal and extra-legal variables. Importantly,
while each of the analytic strategies differs slightly, the pattern is consistent-
legal variables significantly affect pretrial release decision outcomes.
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pattern. Neither the release recommendation of the Pretrial
Agency nor recorded misdemeanor convictions have a
statistically significant impact on this decision. But charge
severity and recorded felony convictions continue to affect the
decision in the expected direction. The relative importance of
charge severity is particularly striking. It is largely because of
its impact that the configuration of "legal" variables explains,
not discounting the variance shared with extra-legal variables,
21 percent of the variance in bail amount. The total variance
explained with legal and extra-legal variables included is .23.
Finally, turning to Table 4, in which the decision to offer a
cash alternative (Y 3 ) is the dependent variable, we find yet
another pattern of results. Convictions drop out of the picture
entirely, while the recommendation for release by the Pretrial
Services Agency is once again significantly associated with a
judicial decision in the predicted direction. Charge severity
continues to have its predicted impact. This time, as expected,
it is negatively associated with the probability of being offered
a cash alternative. Looking at the equation as a whole, one
notes that the total explained variance is substantially less
than it was when either the release on recognizance or amount
of bail decisions were dependent variables. The legal variables
as a block, not discounting for variance shared with the extra-
legal variables, explain 5 percent of the variance in the decision
to offer a cash alternative. The legal and extra-legal variables
together explain only 9 percent of the variance.
In considering the influence of legal factors on pretrial
release decisions, one should recall the statutory language:
... In determining that matter [the kind and
degree of control or restriction that is necessary to
secure an accused's court attendance], the court must,
on the basis of available information, consider and take
into account...
While the statute requires the court to consider the factors
specified, there is ambiguity in the phrase "available
information," and it is unclear how a court should act in the
absence of information. If by "available information" what is
meant is that a court must consider information which is
available because it is introduced at the arraignment hearing,
there is no normative implication when a court does not
consider factors, such as the weight of the evidence or the
defendant's financial circumstances, about which it is seldom
informed. If, however, the statutory reference to "available
information" carries with it an expectation that such
information will systematically be sought and presented, then
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blame for the failure to provide information on all of the
statutorily prescribed factors can be assigned either to the
Pretrial Services Agency as the watchdog agency or to the
attorneys who represent the state and the defendants.
Alternatively, depending upon one's view of the boundaries of
judicial responsibility, one might blame the judiciary for their
failure to insist on the availability of all relevant information
before making pretrial release decisions. Regardless of
whether and to whom one assigns blame, it is clear that some
legal factors have no influence not because of judicial
resistance but because information is not available.
It also appears from these analyses that where information
on statutorily prescribed factors is available, the information
affects pretrial release decisions in the way the legislature
intended. Thus, enacted law affects law in action.
B. Are the Effects of Statutorily Prescribed Factors Constant
Across the Three Decisions?
As has already been seen, the effects of the factors
mentioned in the Bail Statute vary with the type of decisions.
(See also Goldkamp, 1979.) Perhaps the most striking
difference is the effect of the Pretrial Services Agency's
recommendation for release. This probably reflects the fact
that community ties, measures of which dominate the Agency's
checklist, is a recent addition to the legislature's list of factors
that courts should consult in making pretrial release decisions.
The decision to weight community ties heavily in bail decisions
reflects in part the recognition that a system dependent upon a
defendant's economic resources to purchase his pretrial liberty
discriminates against the indigent (Ares et al., 1963; Dill, 1972).
It also reflects highly publicized research which showed that
defendants with substantial community ties were, if released
on their own recognizance, more likely to appear at trial than
defendants who were less well integrated into the community
but could make bail. Thus, the movement to make community
ties an important factor in bail decisions was, at the outset,
both ideologically and empirically associated with the
movement to release more defendants on their own
recognizance. Indeed, to this day the Pretrial Agency's
recommendation addresses primarily the release on
recognizance decision. In light of this, it is not surprising to
find that the Pretrial Services Agency recommendation is the
second most salient predictor of the decision to release on
recognizance.
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It is somewhat surprising that the Pretrial Agency
recommendation has no statistically significant impact on the
amount of bail requested if bail is set (see Table 3). For the
cash alternative decision (see Table 4), however, the Pretrial
Agency recommendation affects the outcome decision in much
the same way as it affects the initial release decision, although
it is less important than the identity of certain judges. Here I
can only speculate, but it appears that the decision to offer a
cash alternative is a decision to allow a costless release in
much the same way as the decision to release on recognizance.
Defendants offered a cash alternative need not find a willing
bail bondsman, and if they show up at trial, their money is
refunded. It may be that judges who feel they must set bail
despite the Pretrial Agency's recommendation for release
compromise and allow a cash alternative in such cases. In this
connection it is interesting to note that judges A, C, and F-the
three judges whose presence on the bench is most strongly
associated with the decision to offer a cash alternative in Table
4-are three of the four judges whose presence on the bench is
not significantly associated with the decision to release on
recognizance. This suggests that some judges may regard the
cash alternative as an alternative to release on recognizance
and so offer cash alternatives in situations (e.g., when there are
favorable Agency reports) where other judges would release
without bail.
The effect of sentence exposure, as measured by charge
severity, also varies depending upon the decision context, as
does the effect of the prior criminal record. Charge severity is
the most salient of the independent variables for the first two
decisions, but when the cash alternative is the dependent
variable, its magnitude is less, as is its salience relative to the
other variables. Similarly, the influence of a defendant's prior
criminal convictions is substantial for the first two decisions
and absent for the third decision. This may be because each of
these variables, although legal, also reflects danger, a factor
that is not to be considered in setting bail except in
extraordinary circumstances. I cannot separate out the extent
to which these variables have the influence the legislature
intended from the extent to which they encourage judges to
engage in preventive detention. If the latter influence exists, it
may be that it plays itself out in the decisions to deny release
on recognizance and set particularly high bail. From a
preventive detention' standpoint, if high bail has been set, the
apparent concession of the cash alternative may not matter.
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It appears from these analyses that legal factors are
somewhat less important to the cash alternative decision than
they are to the initial release decision and the decision on bail
amount. This may be because the cash alternative is a recent
and, for this reason, an unfamiliar option in New York bail
procedures (Thomas, 1976). Also, judges may not be sure
whether the factors that the Bail Statute prescribes for
consideration are meant to apply to the cash alternative
decision. The statute reads as follows:
... To the extent that the issuance of an order of
recognizance or bail and the terms thereof . . . the
following factors ... (510.30 § 1)
If the cash alternative is regarded as an alternative to a bail
bond, and thus not part of the terms thereof, the statute, if
interpreted literally, does not apply, and judges have no
statutory guidance in deciding whether to offer a cash
alternative. Finally, there may be a statistical problem here.
The decision to offer a cash alternative may interact with the
decision on bail amount. The model presented here is not
sensitive to such interaction.
The fact that the Pretrial Services Agency's
recommendation is important to the release on recognizance
decision but not to the decision on bail amount may be
attributable to the way in which the Agency presents its
information to the judge. It recommends release on
recognizance or it issues no recommendation, but in neither
case does it systematically give the judge information on the
specific factors (e.g., the defendant's employment, family ties,
and length of residence in the community) that have
determined its stance. The Agency's report takes no position
on the amount at which bail should be set should the judge
decide to set bail. Thus, although the Pretrial Agency's
recommendation is based on measures of community ties and
other factors that should, according to the statute, influence
both the release on recognizance and terms (i.e., bail amount)
decisions, the Agency casts its recommendation in a form that
addresses only the release on recognizance question. It is
possible that if the Agency gave the judge its detailed
information on the factors, such as community ties, that
influence its decision, the judge would, in accordance with the
statutory scheme, weigh such information in deciding on the
amount of bail. It is also possible that these factors would only
influence the bail amount decision, or would have their greatest
impact on that decision, if the Agency translated the factor
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scores into recommendations for specific bail amounts should
bail be set. For it is possible that in the release decision the
judge who follows the Agency recommendation is influenced as
much by the suggestion of shared responsibility as he is by his
knowledge that the Agency recommendation reflects the
accused's community ties.
Looking separately at the three stages of the bail decision
process does not resolve all the questions raised regarding the
influence of legal variables, but it does emphasize the
importance of examining the impact of legal factors in a variety
of decision contexts. Had I looked only at the release on
recognizance decision, I might have thought legal factors
dominated. Had I looked only at the bail amount decision, I
would have thought that legal factors were less central and
community ties, in particular, of no importance. The actual
situation is more complicated and more interesting.
C. Do Factors Not Prescribed in the Statute Affect Pretrial
Release Decisions?
A review of the effects of age, sex, race, language,
education, the nature of the crime(s) charged, the presence of
open cases, and particular judges shows that each of the three
pretrial release decisions is affected by factors that are not
statutorily prescribed. The pattern of results leads to three
conclusions. First, to the extent that "extra-legal" is defined as
that which is not prescribed in the formal law, I find support for
the thesis that judicial decisions are influenced by a host of
extra-legal factors.
Second, the extra-legal factors most commonly emphasized
in the literature, e.g., age, race, sex, and social class, do not
predominate. They are not the most salient of the non-
statutorily prescribed factors affecting pretrial release
decisions, nor do their effects exceed those of the more
important statutorily prescribed factors, e.g., charge severity.
Education, which is as close as I can come in this relatively
homogeneous sample to a measure of social class, is nowhere
significant.28 The same is basically true for the age of the
defendant. The defendant's sex is significant for the first
decision-males are 12 percent less likely to be released on
recognizance than are females-but not for the latter two. This
is consistent with other research on criminal justice outcomes
28 I have not directly measured social class because this population of
defendants, like many drawn from state court data, has little variation on this
dimension. Education, however, does have reasonable variability.
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(Nagel and Hagan, 1982b). The defendant's race has no effect
on the decision to release on recognizance and small effects on
the bail amount decision and on the decision to offer a cash
alternative.29 While the effect is small, it is in the direction
predicted-bail tends to be lower for whites, and they are more
likely to be offered the cash alternative option. In short,
neither the labeling nor the conflict theory approach finds
much support in these data. In this jurisdiction, for this sample
during the period studied age, race, sex, and education predict
poorly to pretrial release decisions.
Third, the effect of factors not statutorily prescribed varies
across the three decisions. The importance of contextual
variation is underscored for extra-legal factors as it was for
legal factors.
D. What Kinds of Biases Are Suggested by Those Factors Not
Prescribed in the Statute Which Affect Pretrial
Release Decisions?
Here I want to distinguish between what I call bench bias
and social bias. Social biases are the kinds of biases discussed
in the preceding section. Bench bias refers to the tendency of
particular judges to prefer some kinds of outcomes to others
regardless of case characteristics. The law's norms do not as an
ideal allow for either type of bias--decisions should be affected
by, and should only be affected by, legally relevant case
characteristics. However, as a normative matter the two types
of bias have different implications. Social biases involve
consistent discrimination for or against a class of people (e.g.,
blacks, women, the elderly). Bench bias, as Lawrence
Friedman points out (1977: 65-66), is with respect to other bases
of social classification essentially random.30 It is luck rather
than some personal characteristic that determines whether
one's case will be heard by a "hanging" judge.
Bench bias has a statistically significant effect on all three
decisions, but it is of considerable importance only when the
issue is whether to offer a cash alternative. Looking first at the
29 In an analysis not reported here I further subdivide this sample into
serious felonies and less serious felonies and misdemeanors. The significant
effects of race (blacks tend to face higher bonds if bail is set, and Caucasians
are more likely to be offered a cash alternative) are of low relative importance
and confined to the most serious felonies. A copy of the tables breaking the
analysis down by charge seriousness is available from the author.
30 Bench biases may interact with social biases. For example, other
things being equal, Judge X may be especially likely to demand high bail of
black defendants. He may treat white defendants in the same way other judges
do.
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decision to release on recognizance and using the conservative
measure of the unique increment which judicial identity makes
to the total amount of explained variance (what psychologists
call "usefulness"), I find a net incremental increase in
explained variance of only .008, but this is significant at the .01
level. Looking at Table 2, I note that some judges, e.g., Judge B,
Judge I, Judge J, are, in comparison with their brethren,
particularly likely to release defendants on their own
recognizance.
When bail amount (Y2 ) is the dependent variable, bench
bias appears to be confined to Judge D, who is exceptionally
lenient in setting bail. It is some measure of the importance of
a single judge that the information on judicial identity adds a
unique contribution of .013 to the total explained variance. This
is significant at the .01 level.
With respect to the first two dependent variables, bench
bias mattered but not very much. When the question is
whether to offer a cash alternative, bench bias is overwhelming.
The R2 without consideration of the variation explained by
judges is .05. The net increment added by introducing judges
into the equation is .04. For the cash alternative decision,
judicial identity appears to have about as much explanatory
power as the legal variables and other extra-legal variables
combined. This suggests that, at least in the early days of the
cash alternative option, decisions regarding it were largely a
matter of judicial taste.
Lawyers, on the basis of their day-to-day experience, have
long propounded the thesis that the fate of defendants at
pretrial depends on the judge before whom they appear. The
results reported here confirm this observation but only to a
limited extent. The importance of the judge factor depends on
the decision in question. While the judge's identity is generally
of importance to the release on recognizance decision, its
importance is dwarfed by other factors. Furthermore, an
analysis not presented reveals that the influence of judicial
identity is largely confined to defendants charged with
misdemeanors and the less serious felonies. Where defendants
charged with serious felonies are considered, only one judge,
Judge J, is significantly different from his fellows. When it
comes to setting bail, most judges are not discernibly different,
but because of the presence of one exceptionally lenient judge,
a defendant can get very lucky.31 In the decision on whether to
31 The conclusion that the judges in my study show no differences in their
decisions on bail amount must be tempered by the recognition of a selection
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offer a cash alternative, the influence of the individual judge is
paramount among factors associated with the outcome.
For most persons, especially those interested in the
plausibility of conflict or labeling theories, the more critical
question is whether the influence of extra-legal factors is
interpretable as a social bias which results in discrimination
against the underprivileged classes of society. I have already
concluded that the view that age, race, sex, and education are
primary determinants of pretrial release outcomes is not
substantiated by these data, although some evidence of social
biases exists. Whites had somewhat lower bail than blacks or
Hispanics, and they were slightly more likely to be offered a
cash alternative. Also, those whose primary language is
Spanish fared slightly worse than English speakers on the bail
amount decision. However, while these effects are statistically
significant, they are neither more salient than the legalfactors,
nor are they generally more substantial than other extra-legal
factors. In short, I have identified indicators of the three
determinants of pretrial release decisions that are not
prescribed in the statute. These extra-legal influences are
bench bias, social bias, and a judicial concern for
dangerousness.
Determining Release on Recognizance
While bench bias and social biases relating to age and sex
influence the decision whether to release on recognizance,
there is no clear course of redress or reform. To eliminate
bench bias, one would have to further standardize decisions.
The history of bail is replete with criticism of bail schedules
(see, for example, Freed and Wald, 1964). The Federal Bail
Reform Act, and the New York Bail Law modeled after it, were
passed, in part, to attenuate the relationship between the
charged offense and bail decisions, to reflect the degree to
which community ties predict to later court appearance, and to
encourage individualized decisions through discretion
structured by the factors prescribed in the statute. To
recommend increased standardization would be to recommend
a return to a system that has proved unsatisfactory.
bias problem. Some judges were more liberal than others in releasing
defendants on their own recognizance. Thus, the defendants they set bail for
are likely, as a group, to be less attractive on variables I was unable to measure
than the defendants encountered by those who were not particularly likely to
release on recognizance. A similar pattern of bail setting controlling for
measured variables could, were everything in fact held constant, reflect a
tendency by judges who were liberal in releasing on recognizance to set
somewhat lower bail amounts.
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Apart from these variables there is only one other way in
which the factors that influence the ROR decision depart from
the statute's normative model. Defendants charged with
violent offenses (e.g., murder, arson, rape) are less likely to be
released on recognizance than those charged with less violent
crimes of equal statutory severity. An analysis not reported
shows this effect to be confined to the most serious statutory
felonies. 32 Since the violence of the offense is related to danger
to the community, and not to the risk of appearance, and there
is no statutory authority to consider dangerousness (see People
v. Welch; People ex rel. Shaw v. Lombard), this suggests that
extra-legal factors have some inappropriate influence. But this
judgment is clouded by the fact that New York case law allows
remand without bail in cases of extreme dangerousness. The
fact that the association between the violent nature of the
crime charged and the decision not to release on recognizance
is significant only in the case of serious felonies and is, in fact,
reversed in the case of less serious felonies and misdemeanors
is at least consistent with the claim that the consideration of
dangerousness is responsive to what the law allows.
To the extent that dangerousness is a consideration in
cases less extreme than those the case law contemplates,
Friedman probably identifies the root of this influence when he
writes:
Scholars who study how judges decide cases have
spent enormous amounts of time and energy studying
legal variables, role variables, attitude variables, value
variables, background variables, socio-economic
variables, and so on. They have spent surprisingly
little time and effort on another factor, which may be
the strongest of all: the pressure of outside force, of
public opinion, in short, of the world in which the
judges live (1977: 109).
Determining the Amount of Set Bail
The decision concerning bail amount (Y2 ) is affected by
fewer legal and extra-legal factors than is the release decision
(Y1 ). Yet, the amount of explained variance is almost identical
(for Y1, the R 2=.21; for Y2 , the R 2 =.23). The determination of
the bail amount seems most responsive to the severity of the
crime charged and the defendant's prior criminal record. These
are legal variables, but they may influence the judge in part
32 Those charged with violent misdemeanors or less serious felonies are
actually somewhat more likely to receive a release on recognizance if statutory
seriousness is held constant.
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because of what they suggest about dangerousness. There is
some evidence of social bias, bench bias, albeit limited to one
judge, and bias introduced by the consideration of whether the
charged offense is a crime of violence. As with the release
decision, the last is only important when serious felonies are
charged. Two of these three raise important policy questions.
The evidence of some discrimination, however small, in favor of
whites (as compared to blacks and Hispanics) and against
those whose primary language is Spanish suggests that
discrimination against the socially disadvantaged is still a
problem with which to wrestle. The evidence of a premium
charged for serious, but not the less serious, crimes of violence
raises the question of whether the money bail system allows
the cosmetic fixing of high bail to accomplish the unlawful
purpose of preventive detention.
Determining the Cash Alternative Offer
The decision to offer a cash alternative is most distinctive
for its unpredictability. The amount of explained variance
(R 2=.09) is low and borders on the vanishing point when
judicial identity is not considered. The impact of individual
judges is remarkable. For example, holding constant the legal
variables and extra-legal variables I have considered, appearing
before Judge A brings with it a probability of being offered a
cash alternative that is 78 percent higher than the average.
Conversely, appearance before Judge E carries with it a
probability of a cash alternative that is 23 percent below the
average. This study suggests that the cash alternative decision
is in its determinants unlike the decision to release or the
determination of the amount of bail. While there is a
suggestion in the data that some judges may use the cash
alternative as an alternative to release on recognizance (e.g.,
Judge E is 9 percent above the average in his willingness to
release on recognizance while Judge A's behavior does not
differ significantly from the average), the evidence is too sparse
to warrant any conclusions. Future research should seek to
determine whether such a substitution effect exists or whether
the decision is a random reflection of judicial tastes. No matter
what the findings, we must learn more about how this pattern
has come to be in order to address intelligently the policy
questions that arise.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
I began with a set of research questions, all of which are
relevant to the legal/extra-legal controversy. I was interested
in exploring in a preliminary way whether factors specifically
prescribed for consideration in the Bail Statute affected pretrial
release decisions and whether their impact varied with the
particular pretrial release decision at issue. To the extent that
factors not specifically prescribed by the statute were
influencing pretrial release decisions, I was interested in
discerning whether such effects were suggestive of bench bias
or of more systematic discrimination against the socially
disadvantaged. The analyses suggest several conclusions that
are of general importance in socio-legal research.
First, the hypothesis that formal law is but one entry into
the decision calculus of those given responsibility for the
application of law is supported. If one takes, as I have here, the
category of "legal factors" in the legal/extra-legal debate to be
coextensive with what is defined in the formal written law (e.g.,
statutes), my results are consistent with the longstanding
argument of interaction theorists who study societal responses
to deviants (e.g., Becker, 1963; Kitsuse and Circourel, 1963;
Goode, 1975). There is a less than perfect correspondence
between the formal law and its application. More specifically,
these findings can be said to be consistent with the hypothesis
of legal realists (e.g., Fuller, 1934; Ulewellyn, 1930; 1962) that
legal rules are but one consideration in judicial decisions. The
findings strongly suggest, however, that legally specified
criteria play a role and often a dominant role in such decisions.
This suggests that attempts to document the impact of extra-
legal factors on legal decisions will, if they do not adequately
measure legal factors, present a misleading picture. This is not
just because extra-legal variables will be spuriously significant
(see, e.g., Hagan, 1974). It is also the case that if influential
legal variables are excluded from our models, there will be a
distorted picture of both the relative importance of extra-legal
variables and the legality of judicial decision-making in general.
One implication is that sociologists of the law must be able to
work with legal source material as well as empirical data.
Second, and perhaps more interesting, is that the saliency
of the role of statutorily prescribed factors varies across
decisions. This finding underscores the importance of context
in research of this kind. One implication is that the
presumption that societal responses to deviants, court
responses to defendants, or judicial decisions can be explained
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by one overarching theoretical model is likely to prove
untenable. Research examining the multitude of decisions that
surround each type and stage of decision seems necessary if
we are to understand what is going on. Studies of sentencing
decisions might, for example, reveal more if they focused
separately on the decision whether to incarcerate, the choice of
non-custodial sentences (e.g., fine and probation), and the
length of custodial sentences (e.g., jail or prison time) in the
appropriate subsamples (see, for example, Wheeler et al., 1982;
Nagel and Hagan, 1982a; Hagan and Nagel, 1982). My
expectation is that the influence of statutorily prescribed
factors, as well as non-statutorily prescribed (what I have
called "extra-legal") factors, will vary across these decision
contexts.
Third, my findings suggest that it is useful to separate the
effects of statutorily prescribed (legal) factors from those
suggestive of bench bias, social bias, and other influences. By
so doing, one may gain insight into the conditions under which
racial and other forms of discrimination are more or less
pronounced, as well as a more realistic estimate of the bias
introduced by inter-judge variation and some sense of the
conditions under which extra-legal factors compete with or
even exceed the impact of statutorily prescribed factors.
Fourth, I argued in my introductory remarks that one
should not assume that certain factors are or are not legal. Law
in the books, as law in theory is sometimes termed, is what the
written laws, as modified by court decisions, actually state
(Weber, 1954). It may be discovered in the law library without
benefit of the sociological imagination. Where the law has been
codified, the legal/extra-legal controversy can best be explored
by the simultaneous consideration of statutorily and non-
statutorily prescribed factors. Even in this .instance, however,
case law should be examined to check for judicial amendments.
Race, age, sex, and other demographic measures are clearly
not the only extra-legal factors that can influence judicial
decisions, even though research influenced by conflict and
labeling theories appears most concerned with such variables.
In the case of pretrial release decisions, the extra-legal factors
seemingly most determinative of pretrial release decisions are
the perceived likelihood that the defendant would be
dangerous if freed and the identities of the individual judges.
The New York Bail Statute does not authorize the judge to
consider danger in deciding whether to release the defendant
or in determining the amount of bail. New York case law
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glosses the statute by allowing remand without bail where the
defendant is thought to pose an extreme danger and seems to
say that likely dangerousness may not be considered if the
danger is not extreme or in setting the amount of bail if
remand without bail is not justified. However, but for the case
law, it would be incorrect to call the consideration of danger in
situations where it is not extreme "illegal." Illegal seems to
imply that the formal law prohibits its consideration. The New
York Bail Statute does not say directly that danger shall not be
considered and is ambiguous about whether the criteria it lists
are meant to be exclusive. The question of justice is a
philosophical and moral issue which is not easily resolved.
This brings me to my final point.
I believe that the distinction among the kinds of factors
that have extra-legal effects is the key to drawing policy
implications from court outcome research. To the extent that
race or ethnic discrimination can be identified as being
pronounced in a particular decision context or associated with
a particular outcome, such as the cosmetic fixing of high bail,
modes of redress can be explored and suggested. To the extent
that predictions of dangerousness are influential in spite of the
law, one can call for reform to handle, on the one hand,
society's real concern for danger, and on the other hand, the
protection of defendants from inappropriate over-predictions.
And to the extent that the law compounds the effects of
previous discrimination, which it may by authorizing a judge to
consider a defendant's prior record (where prior record can be
shown to be unrelated to the risk of appearance), one can
suggest that the law be changed accordingly.
The legal/extra-legal controversy has for too long dictated a
model of research that has failed to give due weight to either
side of the debate. The complexities of law have often been
ignored, and the extra-legal category has been narrowly and
selectively defined. My research suggests that both
components should be refined and reexamined as part of the
continuing process that seeks to understand the bases for the
decisions that lead to court outcomes.
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